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South Africa has become the dominating political topic of the
1970's. Although apartheid has been the legal framework on which
the South African government has based its political, social, and
economic institutions since 1948, and has been a de facto way of life
since the 1600's, it is only today that widespread recognition of the
contradictions that exist within South African society has emerged
to become an international concern. There exists the inherent con
troversy in a dilemma such as the one in South Africa (where a powerful
minority controls all the resources in the country and is reluctant
to hand over the privileges connected with this power) as to the means
by which the oppressed must struggle to achieve liberation. Government
circles, mindful of capitalism's enormous investment in South Africa's
economic sector, strenuously advocate negotiation as the means for trans
ferring political power from the hands of the Afrikaaner to the African.
The upper echelons of the U.S. and its allies are being pressured by the
multinationals to preserve the economic order of the country at the cost
of the African struggle itself. The African knows that the only means
by which South Africa will be returned to him is by the use of violence
as a weapon of struggle against the apartheid state. This knowledge has
evolved as a result of experiencing the futility of non-violent resis
tance in various movements throughout South Africa's history of oppression
and exploitation. Non-violent resistance, based on Christian ethics and
the realization of the power contained within the state's military apparatus,
was believed to both appeal to the white man's sense of morality and also
protect the African from repercussions resulting from resistance. This
notion, although perhaps unconsciously realized at the onset of govern
ment response to non-violence with violence, finally culminated during
the massacre at Sharpeville into a new philosophy of resistance recog
nizing the inevitability of violence as the only means by which change
can occur- a change entailing no less than the radical redistribution
of power and wealth. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the
political history of the African National Congress of South Africa from
the time of its inception in 1913 as an elitist reform movement advocating
participation for Africans within the existing system by constitutional
change into a movement recognizing the utilization of violence as the only
means by which radical transformation of the South African state can occur.
Emphasis will be placed on the failure of the various non-violent campaigns
conducted by the ANC during the 1950's and the failure of passive resis
tance as a means of struggle against the massive state apparatus of the
government. Although the ANC has continued to be a viable tool of resis
tance throughout the 1960's and 1970's, this political history will end
with the disbandment of Umkonto we Sizwe in 1963. Umkonto will not be
examined as a separate political movement, but rather as the military arm
of the ANC-power, and emphasis will be placed on Umkonto's justification
for turning to violence, rather than the dynamics of the movement as a
whole.
The Background
On April 7, 1962 the first Dutch colonists, under Jan van Riebeek,
were established at Table Bay to "provide that the East Indian ships...
may procure... herbs, flesh, water, and other needful refreshments."
-■•Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, The Oxford History of South Africa,
Vol. I (Oxford;The Clarendon Press, 1969) p. 187
By 1682, 700 Europeans were living in the settlement, producing wine
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and wheat for export, as well as revictualling the ships. The Dutch
settlers were joined before the end of the seventeenth century by
Hugenots, fleeing religious persecution in France.
It appears to be chauvinistic to begin summarizing South African
history with the coming of the white man. Yet, the nature of the problem
being explored here begins with confrontation between the colonial settler
and the indigenous African. It is important to understand that the
Afrikaaner have had over three hundred years to build the necessary
state apparatus needed to control a population nearly four times their
own.
Serious British occupation began in 1806, but did not really develop
until the latter part of the nineteenth century with the discovery of
diamonds and gold. The Dutch-style pastoral life, which also depended
to a great extent on African labor, ceased to be the mainstay of the
economy. Massive investments were made in the mining companies that
extracted the precious minerals from the sub-soil, employing black
workers under conditions of intense exploitation.
South Africa is wealthy; it is the richest, most economically
developed country on the continent. It possesses vast economic resources:
the most important of these remains the underpaid African worker, whose
labor provides the ruling European minority with the highest per capita
income in Africa and one of the highest in the World. Against this, it
has been estimated that the cash earnings of an African worker in the gold
mines were no higher in real terms in 1966 than in 1911.
^C.R. Boxer, The Portugese Seaborn Empire(LondonrHutchinson, 1968) pp.106-127
Richard Gibson, Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1972) p. 19
|lbid, p. 20
Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Harmondsworth:Penguin
Press, 1969) p. 513 "~~
The wages of Africans in industry are somewhat higher, but they hardly
share in South Africa's economic prosperity.
Only thirteen per cent of South Africa's 472,347 square miles has been
allocated by the white minority-regime to Africans, who comprise nearly
seventy per cent of the population. The so-called Bantu areas are im
poverished rural ghettoes. Within these areas, there are no industries and
no major towns and cities. Communications are poor, despite the high den
sity of population in the north and south east. African agriculture is mostly
subsistence farming to maize and sorghum on poor, eroded soils.7
Land, or lack of it, has been an extremely important factor in the
resistance movement of South Africa. The ANC was initially formed to
protest the first of South Africa's Land Acts and many subsequent cam
paigns were aimed at promoting the redistribution of land with more
favorable results from the African. Two-thirds of all Africans still live
in white areas where they may be evicted at any time. Most of the people
who live in white areas work within the city or in the mines.
In the large cities, Africans have to live in ghetto-like areas
called "townships", which are physically separated from the rest of the
city. Men who come to the cities seeking employment are not allowed to
bring their wives or children with them. As a result, they move con
stantly between the cities and the rural areas. Sometimes they work
for a year or more before returning home for a short time.8
By depriving Africans of the right to settle in one place and the
right to own property, the government creates a vast pool of migratory
labor that can easily be channeled to satisfy the needs of the South
Gibson, op>. cit., p. 20
7Ibid
African Research Group, Race to Power.(New York: Anchor Press, 1974) p. 10
African economy. The system of migratory labor destroys family life.
It forces them to live as isolated individuals in a permanent state of
uncertainty. Traditional ways of life and culture are destroyed in the
urbanization process, at the same time prohibiting the African from par-
ticipating in the dominate white culture.
Black South Africans have never submitted willingly to white rule.
As the Europeans gradually expanded away from the coast into the in
terior by taking over their land, and after burning scores of villages,
Blacks mounted fierce resistance against the intruders to maintain con
trol of the land.
The advance of first the Dutch and then the British into the in
terior of the country precipitated almost continuous fighting. Africans'
determination to keep control of their land and their people presented
the colonist with nine full-scale wars between the years 1779 and 1879.
Even without guns, different groups of Blacks routed the invaders and in
some cases made them respect African territorial rights until the nine
teenth century.
When the Boers began their Great Trek away from the Cape, they were
turned back from Natal in the east after being severely defeated by the
Zulu nation. They were forced north by successive defeats at the hands
of King Mshoeshoe in the area of Lesotho and King Sekhukuni in what is
now Transvaal. The Boers were able to defeat the Africans only with
the military help of the British. The British, even with their pheno-
monally superior weaponry, had to rely on playing rival ethic groups off
9ibid, pp. 7-11
10Ibid, p. 30
against each other to finally establish military control over the Afri-
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cans.
African armed resistance lasted for more than two hundred years,
ending with the defeat of the Bambata rebellion of 1906. Led by Bambata,
a Zulu Chief, Africans rose in arms against the expropriation of Zulu
lands and onerous taxes in Natal. Bambata died in battle along with some
other 4,000 Africans. Only 25 whites were killed. The crushing military
superiority of the European was demonstrated again in the shedding of
12
African blood.
Thus began an era of passive non-violent resistance, an era which
was to last for over half a century. The movement most characterized by
fighting a non-violent struggle against the apartheid state was the





HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ANC AND ITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRIJOTfTBR
The South African Native National Congress, later to be known as
the African National Congress, was founded in 1913 as the direct result
of a conference organized by Pixley K. Seme "to devise ways and means
of forming a national union for the purpose of creating national unity
and defending the African's rights and privileges."13 Seme, regarded as
the founder of the ANC, was educated at Columbia University and Jesus
College, Oxford, where he obtained his law degree. On his return to
South Africa, Seme was struck full in the face by the humiliation to
which Africans were subjected, and he was appalled. Africans were
forbidden to walk on the pavement and were compelled to take off their
hat when a white man passed by. Africans could only travel fourth class
on the trains in a sort of cattletruck. White politicans openly ad
mitted that taxes were imposed on Africans to make them work. Policemen
repeatedly demanded proof of tax receipts and passes, arresting those
having none in their possession. The African had no voice in the govern
ment; in the court, he was hardly heard, seldom believed.14 Confronted
with these inequities, Seme contacted three other Africans of the Black
elite; Alfred Mangena, the first Black barrister in South Africa; Richard
Msimang, son of the founder of the Independent African Methodist Church,
and educated in law at Tauton, Somerset; and George Dixon Montsioa, a
descendant of the Baralong Paramount Chief in Mafeking, who was practicing
law at Pietersburg in the Northern Transvaal. They decided that the first
13
Peter Walshe, The Rise_ of African Nationalism in South Africa. (Berkeley
University of Cal. Press, 1972) p. 34
BenS ^^ ^i Patriots (Chicago:Encyclopedia Britannica Press,
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step towards resistance was to call a conference of all African leaders and
chiefs, on January 8, the conference began. Seme called for a resolution
to "unite together and form a federation of one Pan-Africanist Associa
tion." The goals of the proposed organization were to:
(1) unite all the various tribes of South Africa.
(2) educate public opinion on the aspirations of
the Black man of South Africa.
(3) be the mouthpiece of the African people and their
chiefs.
(4) advocate on behalf of the African masses for equal
rights and justice.
(5) represent them in the Union Parliament, and
generally to do all such things that are necessary
for the progress and welfare of the African
people.
Thus began the African National Congress.
The ANC can easily claim to be one of Africa's oldest formally
organized and recognized resistance movements. Founded in 1913, it pre
dates even the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) in the United States, which it greatly resembled during most of
its legal existence in South Africa. Indeed, like the NAACP, the ANC had
its roots in the Christian church and was an elite-led organization which
strived towards achieving full citizenship through constitutional means
in the courts.
Christianity was an extremely important element in the formation and
operation of the ANC movement:
"Christian ethics had therefore but one clear
social implication in the minds of politically-
conscious Africans. The churches were expected
to be the vanguard of public opinion leading
society away from racial discrimination to a
color-blind equality of opportunity." 16
pp. 25-29
Walshe, op. cit., p. 43
The leadership of the ANC was said to be the result of a "missionary
education, the impact of Christian values, the beginning of urbanization,
and the influence of British, Black American and Liberal ideas."17 This
element of Christianity in the ANC, along with the other aforementioned
influences, tended to "embourgeoisify" the movement, leading more towards
goals of participation in the existing system rather than towards the full
transformation of society. Edward Feit, in his analysis of the ANC, re
garded the role of the Christian bourgeoisie in the movement as one that
came about "by force of circumstances rather than through personal choice,"
and that their entry in the political arena "was perhaps less due to their
own wish to participate in racial politics that to the feeling that, being
forced to the same level of the masses by external constraints, he must
break the system in order to establish his supremacy over them.18 Bloke
Modisane, himself a prominent member of the ANC, confirms Feifs assertion:
"And because the Africaaners were such unintelligent
oppressors, they disturbed the perfect tranquility
of the African middle-class, mingled them with the
commonality; the old guard, masters of consultations
and concessions and compromise, found themselves with
out a protector, co-mingled with the common dust;
then out of expedience, rather than loyalty, they
looked for recognition in that instrument of rebellion,
the African National Congress."19
Yet, in all resistance movements, it is precisely from within the indi
genous petty-bourgeoisie, a social class which grows from colonialism,
"that arise the first important steps towards mobilizing and organizing
the masses for the struggle against colonial powers."20
j^, p. 160
Edward Feit, African Opposition in South Africa:The Failure of Passive
.^Resistance (Standord:Stanford University Press, 1967) pp. 26^31
2QBloke Modisane, Blame Me On History (London:Thames and Hudson, 1963) p 46
Amilcar Cabral, Return to the Source. (New York:Africa Information Service,
iy/3) p. 69
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To label the ANC as a "liberation11 movement would clearly be an
abuse of the generally accepted definition of liberation. At the time
of its emergence, and through most of its activity up until I960, the
ANC was essentially a "reformist, elite-led association for the better
ment of African economic, social and political conditions within a non
violent, legal framework."21 The professionals, most of them either
lawyers or ministers, who ran the organization regarded it as their
primary task to speak for the people rather than to the people. The African
National Congress did not think of overthrowing the political system
as a whole; the nationalist leadership was essentially reformist; the
nature of the African struggle was not perceived to be a protracted one.
Clearly, the ANC was a protest organization composed of African petty-
bourgeoisie whose solution to settler colonialism lay within a neo-
colonialist framework of merely adding the African bourgeoisie on the
rolls of the state apparatus of South Africa's modern industrial
economy.
The history of the ANC as a whole can be examined by the division
of six separate periods, the distinct attitudes characterizing each
ideological and tactical phase. The first period, from 1913 to
1936, was the heyday of the belief that white liberalism would even
tually and inevitably emerge to reduce discrimination against Africans.
The second period, from 1936 to 1949, was marked by the failure of con-
^Gibson, op. cit., p. 38
Thomas Karis divides the history of the ANC into five periods: To these
five periods I have added a sixth- the emergence of Nelson Mandela's
Umkonto we Sizwe as the military arm of the illegal ANC movement and its
adoption of violent tactics as a means of struggle. Thomas Karis, "South
Africa" in Five African States, Gwendolyn Carter, ed. (Cornell University
Press, 1963) pp. 486-487
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sultative bodies setup by the government, such as the Natives Repre
sentative Council (NRC), whose advice the South African government sel
dom heeded. It was during this period that the Youth League was founded
(1943), and that the alliance with the South African Indian Congress
was forged (1946). The third period (1949-1953) was characterized by
an attempt to develop a mass movement and to mobilize the majority of
Africans; it was also a time of growing militancy and of more strenuous
efforts to build strong alliances with other ethnic groups in the Country.
In this period, passive resistance was adopted as a means of struggle.
The fourth period lasted from 1953 to 1956. in this period, the Con
gress Alliance was cemented, an alliance of African, Coloured, Indian
and White Congresses, and a series of campaigns was conducted. The
following period from 1957 to 1960 was that which conducted a number
of stay-at-home strikes in an effort to bring economic pressure on
the white community.23 To these five periods is added a sixth period
which is not yet ended, that of illegal resistance following the ban
of the ANC by the South African government in 1960. This new era was
marked most notably by the formation of Umkonto we Sizwe and the adop
tion of violence as a means of struggle. Let us now examine the per
iods of development in ANC history more explicitly in order to under
stand clearly the trends in ideology and tactics throughout its exis
tence as a resistance movement.24
"During the years before 1936, many African leaders continued to
hope that cooperation with liberally inclined whites would bring about
a reduction in racial discrimination and a progressive share in political




24Felt' ££' Hit-/ pp. 34-36
section is based on Karis' analysis.
Karis, op. cit., p. 489
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a sense of national identity and provide the government with a repre
sentative body to deal with. Leadership, as mentioned previously,
remained in the hands of professionals and church leaders whose nation
alism was coupled with respect for tribal authority. indeed a council
of tribal chiefs was an integral part of the Congress machinery in the
earlier years of the ANC.
The second period, from 1936 to 1949, was marked by the failure of
the Natives Representatives Council, and the coming of age of a new and
militant urban generation. Dr. A.B. Xuma led an administration which
concentrated on building an economically well-established movement that
could act independently of whites and Indians. "African Claims", which
called for the "abandonment of any policy and all practices that dis
criminate against the Africans in any way whatsoever,"26 were expressed
in manifestos, boycotts, and strikes. The ANC Youth League, established
in 1943, adopted a Program of Action calling for an end to cooperation
with government institutions and for boycotts, strikes and civil dis
obedience to be increased as major strategems of resistance.
During the third period, from 1949 to 1952, the ANC moved towards
closer multi-racial cooperation, and waged a "defiance" campaign against
unjust laws, employing the methods of passive resistance. Leaders of
the ANC and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) cooperated in
organizing a one day strike on May Day, 1950, which resulted in the
killing of eighteen people and the wounding of thirty. Joint planning
for mass action continued, and on June 26, 1952, the Defiance Campaign
began. The campaign consisted of a series of public protests against
2^win"dolyn M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality:South Africa Since 1948
(New York:Praeger Press, 1958) p. 484 ~ —~'
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the apartheid state. "Throughout the remainder of -he year African men
and women, often manifesting a religious fervor, sought arrest by sitting
on park benches marked "Europeans Only." They paraded through the train
station entrances similarly marked and marched through the streets
shouting 'Mayibuye Afrika' (Come back Africa)."27 Zn five months, more
than eight thousand Africans went to jail.
The fourth period, 1953-1956, began with the passing of the Cri
minal Amendment Act by the South African government which increased
the personal risk to be run in any future campaign cf protest. In 1955,
the ANC, the SAIC, the newly organized Congress of rerriocrats (C0D) , and
the Coloured Peoples Organization (COP) formed a mul-.i-racial front
in the Congress of the People. Nearly three thousand people auth
orized a Freedom Charter which demanded equal rights and opportunities
for all. African leaders were divided during this period by the ques
tion of whether or not to collaborate with radical whites. This par
ticular issue, cooperation with the co-called Communists of South
Africa, was a constant source of friction during the history of the
ANC, and would not be resolved until 1959.
During the fifth period from 1957 to 1960 and -.he Sharpeville
massacre, African leaders urged greater militancy, racial assertiveness,
and identification with Pan-Africanism. The readiness of Africans who
share an economic grievance to cooperate "effectively and almost
28
spontaneously" in local protest was evident in the successful boycott
of Johannesburg buses for three months in 1957. In April, 1959, African
Jim Hogan South Africa:Civilizations in Conflict.(BcstonrHoughton Miflin
Co., 1972) p. 62
TCaris, op. cit., p. 493
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nationalists who opposed alliances with "Communist-oriented" organizations
established the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).
On March 21, 1960, at Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg, the
fifth period ended and a new era for the ANC began. On that day, the white
South African police killed sixty-nine Africans and wounded around one
hundred and eighty-six in a crowd that was demonstrating its support
for a new defiance campaign aimed against the carrying of passes.29
Following the Sharpeville massacre, both the ANC and the PAC were banned
by the South African government. The non-violent phase of the resis
tance movement had ended, and the sixth period, that of underground
resistance had begun. Umkonto we Sizwe- Spear of the Nation- was formed
based on the belief that: 1) as a result of the government policy,
violence by the African people had become inevitable, and unless res
ponsible leadership was given to channelize and control the feelings of
the people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce
an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the races which is
not produced even by war; and 2) without violence there would be no
way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against
the principles of white supremacy.30 This era saw the demise of the
Dube, Xuma and Luthuli, and the birth of the Mandela.
This political history of the ANC will end in the year 1963 with
the Rivonia Trial and the subsequent disbandment of Umkonto. To this
day,, the ANC has been actively involved in the resistance struggle in
South Africa, and the years of the sixties and seventies have seen the
ANC grow and develop into a viable tool of struggle against the apart-
^Carter, op. cit. , p. 292
°Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom. (London:Heineman, 1965) p. 168
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heid state. However, since the thesis of this paper is concerned with
the events leading up to the ANC's turn to violence, it is only with
more pertinent dynamics of Umkonto's justification as a movement ad
vocating violence that will be dealt with, therefore, stopping at its
disbandment. The following section included in the overview of the
ANC will examine the organizational structure of the ANC and the type
of leadership within the movement.
Organizational Structure
Congresses in African settings, according to Thomas Hodgekin, are
characterized by looseness of structure, "taking on the form, often,
of local functional associations, grouped around a central junta which
has entire control over policy."31 This statement characterizes the
organizational structure of the African National Congress.32
The base of the ANC was to be the branches, each consisting of not
more than twenty members; each member had to be more than seventeen years
of age and ascribe to ANC policy. Once properly constituted, each branch
was to hold a general meeting at which its officers and not less than
two committee members were to be elected. The branches had two separate
channels through which they would communicate with the national and
provincial bodies. They could send ona delegate to the National Con
gress and one to the Provincial Congress for every twenty members, up
to a maximum of ten members per delegation.
Each Provincial Congress was the highest organ in the four provinces
of South Africa, and the National Congress was the supreme policy-maker
S Hod9ekin' African Political Parties.(Baltimore:Penguin Press, 1961)
ased on the constitution of 1940. ANC was reorganized in 1960 under
Mandela's M-Plan.
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of all. Both conferences were to meet annually and be governed by
similar rules. The Provincial Congress was responsible for ANC affairs
in each province and the National Congress for over-all policy for the
entire country. But as both large bodies were too unwieldy and their
meetings too infrequent for the regular conduct of affairs, a National
Executive Committee (NEC) and a Working Committee were set up to conduct
ANC affairs on a more regular basis. The committees were entrusted
with general supervision and control. It was with them, rather than
with the cumbersome conferences, that real decision-making rested.
The National Executive Committee was, as its name implies, the
nerve center of the ANC movement. Among its members were the National
President, a National Secretary and a National Treasurer. In addition,
it was to consist of fifteen other members all directly elected at the
National Conference. The NEC was to meet at least once every six months
and at such other times as was convened by the Working Committee. The
NEC was to submit a report to the annual conference of the work accomp
lished during the year. The report was to embrace such matters as
activities, organization, finances and the stand of leadership on
national and international events.
Important as the NEC was, the most important decision center was
doubtless the Working Committee. Through its small size and the proxi
mity of its members to each other (members were required to reside with
in fifty members of Johannesburg), the Working Committee actually became
more powerful than the NEC. To perform these functions, the Working
Committee was to meet every month and to place before the NEC a report
of the work, organization and finances of the ANC. The Working Commit
tee was composed of elected members from the National Congress and had
17
full executive powers to carry into effect the decisions of both the
33
National Conference and the NEC.
It is important to understand the dynamics of an organization's
formal structure in order that an understanding of the nature of the
organization itself be revealed. Let us consider the bureaucratic
nature of the ANC. Edward Feit, in his analysis of the ANC, suggests
that a manifestation of a large bureaucracy characterized by real
little control over the concrete actions of an organization is the
result of the leadership's desire for protection of their own status
in the movement. He maintains that the problem of control is inten
sified by the need for a resistance organization to produce results.
In order to gain a following, a movement has to make many promises:
and these promises must soon be realized. If the leadership fails
to achieve the results promised, its status is opened to challenge.
Campaigns launched with fanfare must at least partially achieve their
objectives. Where a government meets challenge with success and threa
tens political action with counter actions, the resistance leadership
is deserted or displaced. Even if the leaders and their cadres sur
vive, and these will shrink with failure, the support group will be
come harder and harder to mobilize with each successive campaign.
Failure and faction feed on each other in any movement for change.
The more often the movement fails, the less likely it is to succeed
in the future unless it happens to be extremely fortunate. The in
surgent leaders under pressure will seek to retain control by imposing
a bureaucratic pattern on the organization for the protection of their
own status being rationalized as protection of the movement itself.
33
Feit, o£. cit., pp. 53-58
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Perhaps the nature of this bureaucratic structure of the ANC can
explain its failure to operate as a mass movement advocating change.
Bureaucratic structures, being founded on predictable actions, are
unsuited for producing continuously unpredictable actions- the foun
dations of successful insurgency. Bureaucratic organizations tend
to concentrate on readily achievable goals, on what does not require
much innovation, and on what can be reduced to routine. The ranked
structures are, what is more, relatively easy to penetrate.34
The organization of a movement on the foundations of a rigid
bureaucratic structure has its roots in the nature of the leadership
itself. Most African leaders were drawn from the educated bourgeoisie
and have their base either in religion or law. Clearly, during the
ANC's early development, the leaders remained remote from the masses
and their needs. Leo Kuper notes that leadership "often became absorbed
in ideological issues remote from the interests of the workers."35
Thus, both the structure and the leadership of the ANC were distinct
entities which kept their distance from the African masses and, con
sequently, failed them by choosing not to mobilize the vast majority
into a viable force of power.
Throughout this examination of the ANC in its rather broad per
spective, it is quite clear that violence was adopted as a means of
struggle only after every other tactical means of struggle had been
exhausted. The ANC was formed in 1913 to defend the rights of the
African people against the oppressive legislation of the South African
34Edward Feit, Urban Revolt j.n South Africa, 1960-1964 (Evanston:North-
western University Press, 1971) p. 307
Leo Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie;Race, Class and Politics in South
Africa (New HavenrYale University Press, 1965) p. 21
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government, namely the South Africa Act and the Native Land Act, and
adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. For thirty-seven years,
until 1949, this tactic was the only means by which the ANC attempted
to resist the racist policy of the government. Even after 1949, the
ANC remained determined to avoid violence. At this time, however,
there was a change from constitutional means of protest which had been
exclusively employed during these thirty-seven years. The change was
embodied in a decision which was taken to protest apartheid legislation
by peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations against certain apartheid laws.
The stay-at-home strikes, resistance tactics used in the late fifties
and early sixties, in accordance with ANC policy, were to be peaceful
demonstrations. Careful instructions were given to organizers and members
to avoid any recourse to violence. The government's answer was to in
troduce new and harsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and to send
armed vehicles and soldiers into townships in a massive show of force
designed to intimidate the people. This was clearly an indication that
the government had decided to rule by force alone, and this decision was
a milestone on the road to Umkonto. Mandela cites seven specific acts
of government violence, from the years 1957 to 1961, to point clearly
that each disturbance led to the inevitable growth among Africans in the
belief that violence was the only way out- it shows that a government
which uses force to maintain rule teaches the oppressed to use force against
it. It is also clear that the ANC has continually waged an intense struggle
wihtin its ranks as to the nature of the struggle itself and the means
by which this struggle could be most effectively carried out with a
minimum amount of African casualties. The ANC began as a reformist
3fcMandela, op. ~cit., pp. 167-170
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movement heavily influenced by a missionary-educated, European-oriented,
African bourgeosie. This elitist core of the ANC movement imposed a rigid
bureaucratic structure upon the organization which hindered any type of
spontaneous insurgency which has characterized more revoluntior.ary move
ments advocating change. The leadership, during its period of con
stitutional struggle, defined its position as that of speaking for the
people rather than to the people. The 1940's gave birth to a more mili
tant urban generation which saw the inherent contradictions in waging a
struggle apart from the masses, and attempted to utilize the power of
African labor in a series of campaigns designed to cripple the white
South African economy. The Youth League represented this militant fac
tion and proved to be a viable source of power within the movement as
can be seen by their ousting of Dr. John S. Moro.ka, a representative
of the bourgeois leadership. The struggle became defined in more mili
tant terms, yet there existed still a sharp division between those members
viewing the struggle as one composed of a multi-racial worker's front
and those viewing it as a struggle between the African and the white man.
This conflict became externally resolved with the formation of the Pan-
Africanist Congress in 1959. A third internal conflict can be seen by the
emergence of Umkonto we Sizwe as the military arm of the ANC coupled
with Luthuli's adamant stand on the principles on non-violent resistance.
By this time, however, the pacifist segment of the ANC was not powerful
enough to cause any real dissention within the ranks. It is therefore
quite evident that the ANC has historically been troubled by internal
conflict which quite often led to a disunity within the movement which
perhaps hindered the resistance movement as a whole.
Violence, as a means of achieving an end, is an extremely difficult
action to justify. However, as this examination of the political history
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of the ANC attempts to show, violence has become the only means by
which the South African people can ever hope to achieve liberation
from the settler colonialism imposed upon them by the European since
the early 17th century. The government has repeatedly shown its
disregard for any peaceful protest by the African. Words must be
backed up by guns.
CHAPTER III
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE AND TOE MOVE TOWARDS PASSIVE RESISTANCE
~ 1913-1949 ' ~ U
The most pressing problem facing the African National Congress
at the time of its inception was the prospect of land segregation.
Scarcely had the delegates gathered for the first annual conference
in March 1913 when momentous issues involving both ideology and im
mediate policy were raised by the Natives Land Act.
The Act, pressured by the interests of the mining industry and
white farmers, established 'possessory segregation', "the old fron
tier policy of complete racial territorial separation."37 was clearly
impossible due to the nature of South Africa's rapidly developing economy.
The alternative adopted consequently involved separate Native and Euro
pean homelands while permitting the residence of individuals in each
others areas. Supposedly a temporary measure to maintain the status quo
pending the report of a land commission, the Act was retained until
Hertzog's Native Trust Land Act of 1936. It allocated land as follows:
Total Area Native
(in morgen*) Reserves %
CaPe 83,700,000 6,217,037 7.5
Transvaal 33,400,000 1,159,296 3.5
Natal 10,650,000 2,972,312 29.7
OFS** 14,800,000 74,290 0.5
Total 142,550,000 10,422,935 7.3
*A morgen is a unit of land measurement, equal to a little over two acres
**0range Free State.
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In addition to the establishment of possesory segregation, the Act
checked squatting by forbidding the movement of Africans from farm
to farm and requiring those who chose to remain on white property to
work ninety days per annum for the privilege. Snarecropping was ter
minated and individuals offered the choice of returning to over-crowded
reserves, working as laborers for a particular farmer or seeking em-
ployment in the mines and in the cities.
This step was the first move by the South African government in
its eventual formation of the apartheid state. Its purpose was to make
it exceedingly difficult for Africans and other non-whites to become
economically independent. The government engineered such drastic
changes in the African's condition that he was compelled to work for
the white capitalist. Once employed, the African was then subject to
complete control of wages, conditions of work, place of employment, and
so on; non-whites had no power and were given few rights to influence
the terms of their employment. The Land Act provided South Africa with
a mass supply of cheap labor and the means to control it.
The ANC was able to "take advantage of this ferment to consolidate
its support amongst the chiefs, the new elite and many less educated
individuals, so entrenching its position as the recognized vehicle for
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protest." The immediate response of the ANC was to reject a move
towards segregation in favor of freedom within the multi-racial context,
that- is, equality of opportunity based on decreasing rather than in
creasing racial discrimination. Dube, President-General of the ANC,
decided to air his grievances to the British Crown rather than deal





of what was thought of as the British policy of non-racialism was evi
dent in the ANC's persistence in appealing to Great Britain for pro
tection. The ANC attributed the Africans' willingness to submit loyally
and cheerfully after military defeat to a belief that the full benefits
of British rule would be impartially applied to all British subjects.
The Land Act ran counter to this, being based on principles of segrega
tion, and the ANC looked to the British for an appeal.
To clarify attitudes during this period, it is essential to recog
nize that the term segregation had several meanings. There were many
variants, and rural land segregation was not seen to be incompatible
with the ANC's demands of direct representation in Parliament or main
tenance of the Cape common roll. To the ANC, reacting in the first months
of antipathy of this specific piece of legislation, segregation meant
land segregation only, and more specifically rural land segregation. In
this, they were ultimately prepared to acquiesce, provided that the actual
division of land was not characterised by the quite unacceptable allo-.
cation of the Land Act of 1913, and provided that racial discrimation was
not to be applied as the basic principle underlying all Native policy in
rural, urban, economic and political matters. In short, rural land segre
gation safeguarding and extending the tribal areas was not seen as an
obstacle to equal opportunity for educated Africans in the wider South
Africa.40
In 1914, after the Act was made law in the South African Parliament,
a delegation of ANC officials traveled to London to appeal to British
justice. The delegation made it clear that their mission v/as one to




public agitation in Britain. After being rebuffed by the Colonial Secretary,
however, the ANC withdrew its restraint on public agitation and demanded
that the Land Act be put to a vote during the Colonial Office vote in the
Commons. Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, referred his questioners to
Sir Syndey Langden's 1903-1905 Commission and insisted that the Act con-
concerned only the Government and the Parliament of South Africa. After this
there was no further tactic save the forlorn hope of a campaign to educate
public opinion. This last hope was interrupted by the War, and the dele
gates returned home.
World War I broke out in Europe and the African National Congress
responded in somewhat the same way as blacks in the United States. The
War was seen as a type of proving ground where blacks could illustrate
their loyalty to the state in exchange for full citizenship and its accom
panying benefits. Public criticism of the government was to be suspended
and Africans were called upon again to demonstrate their loyalty to the
King and the Empire. A delegation was dispatched to Pretoria to assure
the authorities of African support at a time of international crisis, and
to offer to raise 5,000 troops to German South West Africa on the con
dition that they would be fully equipped.
The government's response was that which would greatly resemble their
response to the arming of African troops twenty years later during World
War II. Smuts, Minister of Defense, explained that there was no desire
to make use of the services, in a combat capacity, of citizens not of
European descent; the conflict had its origins amongst the white people
of Europe, and the government was anxious to avoid the employment of its
Native citizens in warfare against whites.4 Although this official action
was seen yet as another denial of common South African citizenship, the ANC
4-'•Ibid, pp. 48-54
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nonetheless supported a national relief fund for the war effort. It was
also agreed to set up a consultative committee to assist the Department
of Native Affairs in recruiting 24,000 Africans as a labor force for the
South West Africa campaign.
The African's reward for his loyalty and cooperation with the
South African government during these crucial years of international war,
a most ripe time for revolt, was the passage of the Native Administration
Bill of 1917. This Bill was designed to separate African administration
and legislation from the European affairs of the House of Assembly. It
was also to establish the basis for a uniform Native policy throughout
South Africa.
The Bill proposed to set up Native and non-Native areas in a rigid
application of possessory segregation. The Governor-General was to
legislate by proclamation for the Native areas and was to be advised by
a permanent commission with the Minister of Native Affairs as Chairman.
Native councils were to be gradually introduced into the reserves with
the intention of giving Africans a voice in their own affairs and en
abling them to interest themselves "in their own evolution." In
dividual tenure was also to be encouraged, villages consolidated and
communities created in which professionally qualified Africans would
find opportunities to serve the African people. As for the non-Native
areas, eight classes of Africans were to be permitted to reside, but only
insofar as they served the white interests.
The Bill was a direct manifestation of the upcoming official policy
of apartheid, or separate development. It was a means of maintaining white
privilege and supremacy in all fields within the non-Native areas, a means
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of using unskilled and semi-skilled African labor for European economic
development, and ensured a steady stream of African labor for the 'white1
economy.
The African National Congress believed that a delegation protesting
again the Land Act and also the Native Administration Act at a time of
peace negotiations in Europe would produce a more flexible reaction from
the Imperial Government. As in 1914 there was no alternative outlet for
constructive influence in South Africa, and the belief persisted that the
earlier delegation had been prematurely cut off by the outbreak of war
from making a deeper impression on the British public. A delegation was
again sent to England, and it met with the same failure as the delegation
in 1914. The British staunchly defended the South African government and
the laws enacted therein.
Looking back at the delegation and seeking to place it in a wider
perspective, this final visit to Britain appears as a major watershed in
the history of the ANC. It was the last serious attempt to obtain British
intervention in South African affairs and it brought to a close the early
period of activity when, in the first flush of its formation and stimu
lated by the Land Act and Native Administrative Bill, the ANC had immed
iately become the widely accepted channel for African political protest.
After the failure of this desperate gesture, the movement lost much of
its coherence and initiative. The support of the chiefs ebbed away,
membership stagnated and later declined, and the ANC began a long struggle
through a quarter of a century of political frustration and organizational
weakness that at times all overwhelmed it.
At its foundation, reacting against the South Africa Act and drawing
upon the influences which had conditioned African political consciousness,
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the ANC had been adamant on the ultimate goal of a non-racial policy for
South Africa. With its involvement in its struggle against the Land Act
this position had been modified, many ANC members revealing a preparedness
born of desperation to accept rural land segregation and even to think in
terms of segregation outlined by certain factions of the South African
government. An adequate land allocation, according to population had been
assumed to be the pre-reguisite for any just form of segregation. In
addition, a link between segregated political instituions and Parliament
had always been a vague possibility. At no time, however, had there been
approval of the Union's existing Native policy.
The Native Administration Bill of 1917 had consequently been rejected,
and by 1919 this process of reaction against the negative example of racial
discrimination had forced the ANC back to its original ideals of equality
before the law for "civilized Africans", equality of opportunity in econo
mic and political life and hence the share of the government of a united
South Africa. A persisting ideological preference for the morality and
political efficacy which the ANC attributed to principles of non-racialism
as a means to the growth of wider loyalties and harmonious government
among all the various peoples of South Africa, can be observed through
out the entire history of the African National Congress.43
After seven years in which opposition to the Land Act absorbed its
energies, the ANC had turned its attention to a wider range of socio-
economic issues. Paced with progressive urbanization and a rising cost
of living, the color bar, pass laws, a heavy burden of taxation and the
need for improved education as a pre-requisite for individual progress
in the developing economy, the ANC formulated attitudes on issues which
43-
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Pointed with increasing clarity to the economic interdependence of the
races. Quite apart from the problem of land, the very process of economic
growth was coming to play an important part in forcing the ANC to develop
its policies on matters which could not be solved on the basis of an
"escapist belief that Africans would find scope for their advancement
amidst the agricultural stagnation of the reserves."44
Protests were channeled once more into constitutional paths and
ideological commitments clarified in the discussion of new objects of
legislation. The most obvious in reactions to the Natives Affairs Act
of 1920 and the Urban Areas Act of 1923. The Native Affairs Act of 1920
had as its predecessor the Native Administrative Bill of i917. It accepted
the land allocation of 1917, and most notably set up a Native Affairs
Commission, made up of Europeans, which was to advise the government and
form a bridge with the African people. The Urban Areas Act of 1923 states
that if in the opinion of the police any Native is 'an idle, dissolute
or disorderly person' he may be brought before the Native Commissioner,
who may order his deportation to his country home, on pain of impri
sonment if he should return to the district from which he has been deported
within a period of two years.45 The Native Commissioner may refuse to
have the defendant represented by a lawyer.
During the 1920's the ANC had attempted to establish a modus
Vivendi with the government and tried to achieve its aims through the
limited constitutional means open to it. Their protests were aimed at
transforming European opinion by the sheer strength of their moral asser
tions, by the justice of their case. Such a transformation would then
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open the doors to equal opportunity, not to political assertation and
African domination. Rather there would be a growing African contribution
to South African society as morality and education triumphed- a reliance
on moral claims which unhappily had little to do with the realities of
political power.
Thus, we see the first period of ANC history marked by repeated
attempts to voice grievances within the constitutional framework of the
South African government. Appeals were made first to Great Britain and
then to the South African Parliament itself, yet the protests were ignored
and the oppressive legislation was increased. The basic themes in these
years of impotence remained the cherished hope of equal opportunity in
the economy and the gradual evolution of qualified and responsible in
dividuals to full participation in the rights of citizenship. Partici
pation within the existing structures of the wider community was the goal
of the African National Congress. This era of strict adherence to a futile
and limited means of constitutional struggle ended in 1936 with the passage
of the Hertzog Bills, representing clearly and unequivocably the role
of the African peoples in the apartheid state.
General Hertzog's Native Bills were first formulated in 1925 as
a series of our bills. The Representation of Natives Bill aimed at
abolishing the Cape Native vote completely, and by way of compensation
a second Bill promised to the Natives of the whole Union a degree of repre
sentation by white senators. The third Bill took the form of an amend
ment to the Native Land Act of 1913 which set up a Committee to delimit
certain land areas of the reserves. For various reasons, the additional
land was not forthcoming. The fourth Bill, known as the Coloured Persons
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Rights Bill, aimed at taking away the franchise from the Coloured people
in the Cape and placing the Coloured voters on a separate roll. By the
end of 1935, however, the bills were reduced to only two. The Bills in their
new form proposed that no more Natives were to be allowed to register as
voters in the Cape province. The 11,000 on the roll would be able to keep
their vote until the Cape Native franchise would die of natural causes.
All Africans would be allowed to elect by indirect means four white members
of the Senate. In addition, the Bill proposed to establish a Native Repre
sentative Council. This council would have the right to pass opinions on
proposed legislation affecting Africans, but the government would not be
bound to conform to its decisions. The second Bill, embodying the 1913
Land Act, was called the Native Land and Trust Bill. it proposed to set
up a board of trustees which would acquire for Africans, with monies voted
from time to time by Parliament, some seven million morgen of land. When
these were acquired, they would increase the existing Native Reserves by
about fifty per cent, thus allowing Africans a total of about twelve per cent
of the land in the country. It was understood that blacks would have to
be content with this for the time being.46
An All-African Conference was called in December of 1935 by Pixley
Seme, founder of the ANC, and was attended by some five hundred persons,
including representatives from Coloured, Indian and African Congresses.
This convention was the broadest gathering of non-whites in South African
history. Its purpose was to unite together in an effort to resist Hertzog's
bills and provide the framework for a more unified front of South African
blacks. The initial results of the meeting were far from spectacular.




Convention decided to plead with the government for a limited African fran
chise and improvement of the situation of non-whites in general. In addi
tion, an appeal was sent on behalf of the African people to London, to the
King and the British Parliament.
Hertzog turned to the All-African Convention urging African acceptance
of his Natives Representative Council. Many leaders of the Convention
favored acceptance and a number of ANC members were elected to the Council.
The Council survived for many years until its abolition by the Bantu Auth-
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orities Act of 1951. The All-African Conference can be looked upon as
a sincere attempt at unity among the multi-racial Congresses of South Africa;
however, no discernible optimistic results concerning any type of signi
ficant change in the situation of non-whites in South Africa was an obvious
result of this Convention. Rather it set the tone for future alliances
between the various resistance movements representing South Africa's Indians,
Coloureds and Africans.
The first expansion of the ANC came in 1940 with the election of
Alfred Bitini Xuma to the presidency of the organization. It was Dr. Xuma
who took the initiative during the early 1940's in developing the logic of
equal opportunity to the point of recognizing its full implication- the
eventual emergence of an African majority as the predominant political power
in South Africa. He also set out to reorganize Congress with the intent to
establish a mass movement. A non-racial ethic remained the central chara
cteristic of the ANC's ideology as it evolved in the 1940's. Mounting
frustrations, Xuma's determined leadership and the influence of the Youth
League had, however, resulted in the application of the non-racial principle
with a new a ruthless logic; all racial discrimination was to be eradicated.
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Coupled with this insistence was the realization that the consequences in
volved political responsibility for the African majority, that is, the use
of the African's political power for the reform of society.48 Let us
first examine the broader political scene in South Africa during these for
mative years of 1940-1949.
World War II was the dominant factor in South African politics during
the early part of this period. Due to the precarious nature under which
the South African government was functioning, a certain patronage was paid
to African organizations in order to insure domestic tranquility during
a period of international crisis. A Native Military Corps was established
in 1940 and Denys Reitz, as Minister of Native Affairs, had been prepared
to defend the arming of these troops in North Africa when and if circum
stances demanded it. He had also been prepared to admit that Africans had
major and legitimate grievances and quoted the Atlantic Charter to the NRC
as a basis of reform. Smuts, too, had defended the arming of black troops
and has also gone against bitter Nationalist Party opposition to arm every
Coloured and African in the face of a Japanese invasion. Speaking on
domestic matters, the Prime Minister recognized the permanence of African
urbanization and admonished the white South Africans for neglecting their
duty to the Africans, particularly in the matter of social welfare.49
The 1942 Smut report on "Social Health and Economic Conditions of
Urban Natives" recommended the administrative recognition of African trade
unions as well as the abolition of the pass laws. A ministerial promise
of impending trade union recognition was subsequently made and the enforce
ment of the pass laws was relaxed. Smut called publically for the eradi
cation of the color bar. Europeans and Natives, he said were so inter-
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dependent that the policy of segregation could never be carried out to its
logical conclusion.
In spite of the government's relaxation of restrictive laws, pre
occupation with the war and maintaining peaceful relations at home, and
the new government policy in general, the ANC did not (as they did not
during World War I) take advantage of this weakening of the pre-apartheid
state. On the contrary, the ANC was even more so convinced that there was
some prospect of significant reform through the rigorous use of consti
tutional channels. What could have manifested itself into a full-scale
resistance movement during a most crucial time of South African politics
and the security of South Africa as a whole, remained to be merely the
strengthening of the ANC's loyalty to the state. Small concessions were
given to Africans in order to insure passivity in their relations with the
South African government, and the ANC did not fail them. Doubtless to say,
it was the African people who were failed.
This period of optimism was brought to an end in early 1543 by the
impending general election. Smuts expressed great sympathy for the African
cause,but spoke of tremendous "snags" in granting parliamentary repre
sentation to Africans. He also showed hesitation on the recognition of
African trade unions.
While the ANC had experienced some initial encouragement as Xuma led
it to a renewed formulation of policy, the climate in European politics had
clearly changed in the course of 1943. It was consequently with some appre
hension and a growing determination to pursue its ideals to their full logic
that the ANC turned its attention to interpreting the Atlantic Charter, and
its back on compromising with the structure of existing legislation.
Ibid, p. 421
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The policy that had been developing under Xuma's presidency was brought
to greater precision by the Atlantic Charter. By using the Charter to give
added weight to its claims, the ANC hoped to elicit a positive response from
the authorities and a clarification of official policy for the eagerly anti
cipated period of post-war reconstruction. Here was a document of inter
national significance, a statement of the war aims of the Allies and prepa
ratory step towards the United Nations. It was hoped that both the govern
ment and a majority of white South Africans would come to see its principles
as the basis for an alternative policy to segregation.
"African Claims" became the basis policy statement upon which later
ANC documents were essentially based. The first section, "The Atlantic
Charter f.nd the Africans" harked back to Smuts' acceptance of the
Charter and went back through its eight points in an attempt to clarify
their meaning and applicability to Africa. Under point one and "no aggran
disement," specific reference was made to Ethiopia's right to full sove
reignty and independence for the former Italian colonies under the protection
of the "future system of world security." In the case of southern Africa,
the point was deemed to support the earlier ANC stand against any transfer
of High Commission Territories to the Union. Point two of the Charter in
volved "no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed
wishes of the people concerned." This principle the ANC accepted as the
right to self-determination, not only for small nations, but for Africans
under European tutelage as in South Africa,where there existed "the pecu
liar circumstances of a politically entrenched European minority ruling a
majority non-European population." In contrast to the normal European
colonial situation and the need for self-government and sovereign rights
African Claims in South Africa, Congress Series No. 11
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in an independent state, ANC demanded full citizenship rights and direct
participation in all affairs of state.
Under the remaining six points, the document insisted on economic
development for the benefit of all peoples in the state concerned, improved
labor conditions, training facilities, social security, adequate housing for
all races and the removal of the color bar. In the case of land there was
an insistence not only for African access to its ownership and use in urban
areas, but a demand for fair distribution of the land as a pre-requisite for
purchase, sale and leasing. The central issues under "Industry and Labor"
involved eradication of the legislation and de facto color bars in every
walk of life: adequate housing, equal pay for equal work, a minimum wage
for the unskilled, insurance schemes, and recognition for the African trade
unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act. Education was seen as the
responsibility of the state and the birthright of every individual as the
means towards the full development of his talents. Free medical and
health service were to be made available to all sectors of the population,
and this would in turn necessitate the expansion of medical and nursing
schools.
Xuma's radical reforms indicated in his "African Claims" are repre
sentative of the expanding militancy of the ANC during this period of its
existence. The document reveals the wide scope of ANC demands and the way
in which these became a clear-cut alternative to segregation, trusteeship
and apartheid- a rejection of the very concept of a distinct Native policy.
They also reveal a growing awareness within the ANC that Africans would
themselves have to shoulder the onerous responsibility of developing their
political influence and using it for the reform of South African society.
Ttoux, op. cit., p. 404
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The ANC Youth League, established in 1943, was too an embodiment of
the growing militancy within the ANC ranks. Edward Roux writes, "that if
a particular event is to be sought for the beginnings of a conscious and
organized Pan-Africanism in the ranks of the ANC it may be found in the
formation of the Youth League."53
The Youth League was active in Johannesburg's Orlando section and
also at Fort Hare. Prominent among the members associated with the league
were A.P. Mda, D. Mji, Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, J.
Ngubane, Robert Resha, Godfrey Pitje, and R.M. Sobukwe (many of whom be
came prominent actors in the formation of Umkonto). Their leader was
Anton Lembede who preached what he called "the ideology of African
nationalism." Nelson Mandela explains:
"There are two streams of African nationalism. One
centers around Marcus Garvey's slogan 'Africa for
the Africans.' It is based on the 'Quit Africa' slo
gan and the cry 'Hurl the white man into the sea!'
This brand of nationalism is extreme and ultra-
revolutionary. There is another stream of African
nationalism, Africanism, which the Congress Youth
League professes. We in the Youth League take into
account the present situation in South Africa and
realize that the different racial groups have come
to stay, but we insist that a condition for inter
racial peace and progress is the abandonment of
white domination and such a change in the basic
structure of South African society that those
relations which breed exploitation and human
misery will disappear. Therefore, our goal
is the winning of national freedom for the
African people and the inauguration of a
people's free society where racial oppression
and persecution are outlawed."54
A major historic contribution of the Youth League to African poli
tical organizations was its emphasis on the African cultural heritage and
Mandela, op, cit., p. 20
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ability for progress through community efforts (which it contrasted with
the white man's individualism).55 This was due to the emergence of a
new urban intelligent that saw the way towards viable resistance in the
development of a movement with a mass base. Traditionally, AMC leaders
remained remote from the people and spoke "for the people rather than to
the people." This new militant generation saw power in the number of
people that could be mobilized in a massive front against the state. We
see these attitudes more apparent in the formation of Umkonto in 1961-
the same goals, the same leaders, only almost twenty years later.
The Youth League was instrumental in the formal acceptance of "African
Claims" by the ANC in 1945. However, the initial optimism that the war
would lead to a reorientation of the 'Native Policy' had been dissipated
by a series of government policy decisions. Late in 1942 industrial un
rest and a series of African strikes in Natal coalfields and the Witwater-
srand led to an emergency proclamation, War Measure No. 145. This pro
hibited African workers from striking, imposed criminal sanctions up to
three years imprisonment and/or a fine of 500 pounds, and provided com
pulsory arbitration of disputes by a civil servant from the Department of
Labor. In the same year the Pretoria City Council failed to implement a
wage board decision in favor of a minimum wage for African employees.
' >.e restrictions placed on African workers during World War II were
not so much a cause of the war itself that a mere continuation of the
government's policy to supply industry with an inexhaustible pool of
cheap labor. A national system of government labor bureaus had been set
up to implement movement controls, to register African workers, to send
them wherever their labor is needed and to enforce the vagrancy laws. All
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unemployed African males over age 15 had to report to a labor bureau, and
employers in general would hire only from one of these bureaus. Africans
failing to report to a labor bureau would be arrested without warrant and
removed from any area. Africans may not take employment from anywhere but
a bureau but a bureau may refuse to permit the continued employment of an
African worker. It may also cancel existing contracts of employment. If
an African refuses to accept a job offered to him, he may be dealt with as
an "idle" or "undesirable" person. The labor system is thus run on the
principle that Africans must do as they are told or suffer the consequences.
Legislation against African workers provided these certain restrictions:
(1) African trade unions are barred from legal recognition
and legal rights.
(2) Strikes by African workers were illegal, punishable by
a fine up to $1,400.00 or three years in prison.
(3) Breaches of contract by African workers are a criminal
offense.
(4) African workers are prohibited from membership in regis
tered trade unions.
(5) African workers are excluded from the negotiation of
industrial agreements which may be applicable to them.56
There are other indirect ways the government exploits the labor of
African workers. The rights of Africans to move to "white areas", and to
stay in them, are restricted and closely controlled, notably by the Bantu
(Urban areas) Act of 1945, as amended, and by the Bantu Laws Amendment
Act of 1964. These measures state that no African may be in an urban
area for more than seventy-two hours without certain special qualifications
or a job. Nor may he enter an urban area without already having obtained a
contract of employment from a government labor bureau. Africans residing
56:
International Labor Office, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor.
(1953) p. 404
40
in "white areas" must apply for permits to continue staying in them, and
such permits may be refused in the event of a surplus of African labor in
any given area. Africans in the "white areas" who are unemployed, who have
left their jobs illegally, or who have been refused permission to remain in
them may be classified as "idle" or "undesirable" persons. Such persons
may be arrested without warrant and sent to a work colony for up to three
years. Furthermore, African workers in prison may be hired out to white
employers. In some areas, especially in food-producing areas where labor
is in short supply, white farmers are permitted to form their own associa
tions to build prison farms. They then use convict labor to work these
farms.37 Since World War II, this elaborate system of forced labor has
merely become more efficient.
Hostilities in Europe had given a major boost to the South African
economy, but with rapid urbanization, widespread slum areas and increased
lawlessness in grossly overcrowded locations, Police raids on Africans in
creased 100%. By 1944 the earlier relaxation of pass laws had been aban
doned, giving rise to a further increase in police activity. In 1945, with
the passage of the Natives (Urban areas) Consolidation Act, controls of
Africans tightened up in an attempt to check the urban influx.
By 1946 Xuma was cooperating with the Indian Congress at a time when
the latter was involved in passive resistance against the perpetuation of
the Asiatic Land Tenure Act. He also persisted in his attempts to gather
mass support by opposing the pass laws. Although Xuma continued to appeal
to international figures of authority such as the United States government
and Smuts himself, the ANC was forced to face up to a fact of which it had
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been uneasily aware of since 1936. Freedom was not going to bo given to
the Africans by anyone but themselves. Gradually, eventually and painfully,
the ANC moved towards a policy of non-cooperation, passive resistance and
civil disobedience in a belated and desperate effort to check the retention
and then the enforcement of the whole pattern of segregation against which
it had protested since its inception in 1913.
The Nationalist Party victory of 1948, and its ensuing policy of "apart
heid", was a milestone in the development of a more militant political
consciousness within the ranks of the ANC. The ANC responded to the re
sults of the election by asserting its own contrasting ideals with greater
vehemence. It also moved under increasing pressure from its more radical
groups towards new methods of protest. The ANC National Executive Commi
ttee and the NRC caucus met in Bloemfontein after the general election
and issued simultaneous statements condemning apartheid as a mere con
tinuation of the long-established policy of segregation and exploitation
of African labor which would inevitably lead to racial strife. Two months
later, in October 1948, a meeting of twelve African leaders was called by
Xuma in an attempt to end the division between ANC and The All-African
Convention. The result was a statement lamenting the marked deterioration
in the prospects open to Africans and condemning the callous disregard of
the fundamental rights of Africans by the government largely with the
acquiescence of the European population. This, in turn, had undermined
any confidence Africans might have had in the justice of white men. The
gathering then committed itself to greater unity and the formulation of a
"Programme of Action" designed to liberate the African people.
In accepting the Programme of Action, the ANC had challenged the cau
tious if committed leadership of its President-General. When Xuma's third
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term of office expired in 1949, he failed to secure re-election and was
replaced by Dr. John S. Moroka. In essence, his removal involved a dispute
over the timing of mass protests, and more immediately the boycott of elec
tions under the 1936 Act. According to the Youth League's analysis, the
very process of attempting mass action would activate latent support of
the ANC and provide the opportunity to place its organization on a mass
footing. The program set out to stimulate the African masses into greater
political consciousness through a boycott of all differentials created es
pecially for Africans, and by the tactical use of strikes, civil disobedience
and non-cooperation. With the Programme of Action began a new era of ANC
resistance philosophy- that of passive resistance.
At first this more precise formulation of long-established ideology
resulted from the stimulus of war and Xuma's leadership. It was then
encouraged, prior to the effects of the 1943 election, by a new willingness
in high places to question the basic assumptions of past "Native policy."
By middle of the 1940's these revived hopes were replaced by profound
disillusionment. It was precisely at this time, however, that the full
impact of the Atlantic Charter and the formation of the United Nations
assured the ANC of the justice of their demands, and although there was
severe reaction against the Nationalist Party victory of 1948 and the
subsequent policy of apartheid, this did not move the ANC to abandon
past ideals and take up counter-racialism.
The result of Smuts' intransigence and the election of 1948 was the
initiation of a search for new methods of protest. Increasingly unsym
pathetic governments gave rise to the reluctance acceptance of non-coopera
tion, as in the adjournment of the NRC, and eventually to the search for
mass support in the defiance of unjust laws. The goal remained a reversal
of official policy, but was now to be achieved by extra-constitutional
pressures. Closely involved with these new methods was the realization,
fostered by the Youth League, that the ANC was ultimately committed to the
deliberate creation of a mass organization as a base for African political
power, to one man one vote, a common voters roll and the eventual exercise
of authority. This authority was nevertheless to be exercised within the
confines of the long-established goals of non-racial justice.58
The years 1913 to 1949 were those of marked change within the ideo
logical and tactical framework from which the ANC operated as a movement
of resistance. Strict constitutional struggle was a complete failure;
each year saw more and more oppressing legislation being passed through
the Parliament. A militant urban generation was coming of age, most evi
dent in the formation of the Youth League, and began to push the movement
into more exacting methods of resistance. Passive resistance became the
means and a more radical change in the system, rather than participation
of the African elite, became the end. The masses were being looked at
more and more as a source of power. The movement was expanding and its





THE FAILURE OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE
AND THE EMERGENCE OF UMKONTO
Xuma was defeated in 1949 by Dr. John S. Moroka, another distin
guished medical doctor. The Youth League had voted for Moroka with mis
givings, which, as it happened, proved to be well-founded. Under Moroka,
the Programme of Action remained a paper program; few of its provisions
were even partly implemented. The only actions was that militant campaigns,
the basis for which had been laid by Xuma, were mounted. The first of
these was the Defiance Campaign of 1952 in which members of the ANC and
the South African Indian Congress were to defy unjust laws and were to
accept prison sentences, refusing fines or bail.59 it was during this
time period that Chief Albert John Luthuli appeared on the scene.
Albert John Luthuli, son of a Zulu chief, was born in Natal in 1898
(?). He was educated at the Methodist Institute in Edendale and studied
teaching along with the ministry. Luthuli was elected Chief of the Umvonti
Mission Reserve in Natal in 1936. Before joining the ANC, Luthuli was
involved with organizing African teachers during the twenties and African
cane growers in the forties. When Luthuli joined the ANC is somewhat un
clear, yet Luthuli's conception of the objectives of the ANC is quite clear:
"The business of Congress is not deliberation
and legislation. Its business is to right the
total exclusion of the Africans from the mana
gement of South Africa, to give direction to the
forces of liberation, to harness peacefully the
growing resistance to continued oppression, and by
various non-violent means, to demand the redress
of justice.60
Luthuli was an idealist; a man of God who believed that protest by peace-
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ful means would achieve freedom for the African people. His campaigns
in the ANC consisted of demonstrations, boycotts, protests and alliances
with other groups. Luthuli believed, like many black Americans in the
1950's, that the vote was the first important tool in full participation:
"There was no longer any doubt in my mind
that without the vote we are helpless. With
out the vote there is no way for us to realize
ourselves in our own lands, or even be heard.
Without the vote our future would be decreed
by a minority of whites, as our past has been."61
In 1952, Luthuli became the leading figure in the Defiance Campaign-
a role that would eventually lead him to the presidency of the ANC. How
ever, it must be noted that the actual dynamics of Luthuli's active role
as a leader within the ranks of the ANC were somewhat doubtful. Luthuli
brought to the ANC a high moral sense, an impressive personality of great
strength, and considerable political naivete. He was respected; his name
was used; but he was taken very little into the Councils of the men who
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actually made ANC policy decisions. Feit notes that in both Luthulifs
speeches and writings and the evidence of witnesses in trials against him
bear out that he was only sketchily informed on what was going on, and then
only after the crucial decisions had been made. Too, Luthuli spent his
entire time as president-general of the ANC under government ban, which
forbid him to take part in any public endeavors associated with politics.
It must, also be taken into consideration that idealists such as Luthuli-
particularly humanistic idealists- do not make good revolutionary leaders.
Their moral scruples always get in the way of action.
Heralded by a day of prayer in many locations throughout the country,
the Defiance Campaign was launched on June 26, 1952. Its objectives were
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outlined in a statement made in "PioneerOfficial Organ of the ANCYL":
"The fundamental principles of the Program of Action
of the African National Congress are inspired by the
desire to achieve National Freedom. By National free
dom we mean freedom from white domination, and the
attainment of political independence. This implies
the rejection of the conception of segregation, apar
theid, trusteeship, or white leadership which are all
in one way or another motivated by the idea of white
domination or domination of Whites over Blacks. Like
all other people, the African people claim the right
of self-determination."63
The Program demanded direct representation in all bodies of the state, the
creation of a national fund to finance the struggle, the political educa
tion of Africans, and the use of the strike and the boycott as weapons in
the struggle. The Defiance Campaign was a manifestation of the ANC's in
creasing militancy during this era of civil disobedience, strike and boy
cott. The Programme of Action outlined the basic strategies to be.employed
by the movement, utilizing the power of the people. The Defiance Campaign
was preceded by a May Day protest in 1950 in which some eighteen people
were killed and many more wounded during clashes with the police. The
decision to undertake the massive Defiance Campaign was, as it seems, made
as an aftermath of this tragedy. The campaign was launched with a formal
letter to the then Prime Minister of South Africa, Daniel Francois Malan,
demanding the repeal of certain specific laws by February 29, 1952, as
otherwise a passive resistance campaign would be mounted. In his reply,
Dr. Malan rebuked the writers for addressing him instead of the Minister
of Native Affairs and indicated that the government had no intention of
repealing the laws differentiating between "European" and "Bantu." Any
attempt on the part of the ANC and its allies to compel a change would be




In response to this letter, and indeed no other reaction from Malan
had seriously been expected, the ANC launched the campaign in which African
and Indian volunteers, reportedly trained in techniques of non-violence,
broke apartheid legislation. These acts, in general, took one or the other
following forms:
Entering a location without a permit.
Being out at night without a curfew pass.
Sitting on railway seats marked "European Only."
Entering the European waiting room on railway stations.
Travelling in railway coaches reserved for Europeans.
Entering the European section of the Post Office.
In other words, the only law directly challenged was the Pass Law, symbol
of domination for the whites and subjection for the African.65
What mattered was not the nature of the laws broken, but rather that
laws were broken. They were broken in the belief that, if courts and prisons
were clogged with mumberless petty offenders who refused bail or fine, the
machinery of repressive legislation would break down through sheer over
load. For a time, this seemed a promising method. The prisons were filling
up and the courts overflowing as some 8,500 volunteers began breaking laws.
But the Campaign was a victim of its own success. Courts began to apply
exising laws more strictly, exacting the maximum penalities. Stiffer sen
tences and the arrests of the leaders under laws for the suppression of
communism took the impetus out of the campaign which began losing momentum.
Early in 1953 the government introduced the Public Safety Act en
abling it to declare a state of emergency and then to issue emergency
regulations, and the Criminal Law Amendment Act which laid down severe
penalties for those convicted of offenses committed by way of protest
against any law. In the face of such opposition, the organizers of the
campaign then decided that it would be best to bring it to an honorable
65 —
Leo Kuper, Passive Resistance in^ South Africa (New Haven:Yale University
Press, 1957) p. 122 ' *
48
end- that is, before it fizzled out. They also felt that it would be
unwise to arrange further demonstrations at a time of tension, and unfair
to expose volunteers to the severe new penalties. The ANC issued an
appeal to the African people to avoid violence at any cost. During this
period, namely in October and November of 1952, there was serious rioting
in Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and in East London, in each case being
sparked off by minor events.
As a store of unused energy remained from the Defiance Campaign, which
would dissipate unless harnessed, the question arose as how best to put
it to use. one way was to channel it into a "Congress of the People," which
was not a new movement but a vast gathering of delegates drawn from among
all the people in South Africa. It would be convened to draw up a new
covenant, a "Freedom Charter" incorporating all the changes they wished
to see in South Africa. The COP, as it was called, was to be truly national.
And to increase the impression of nationalism, organizations of all racial
groups and political complexions were invited to participate. These in
cluded the ANC, the SAIC, the COP, and the Congress of Democratics, a white
Marxist-oriented organization.
At the conference, the Freedom Charter was drawn up and was accepted
clause by clause by acclamation of the 2,000 to 3,000 delegates attending.
The Charter most notably called for a complete transformation of South
African society.™ Although the reforms listed appear to be somewhat
socialistic, Nelson Mandela denies the Charter as being "a blueprint for
a socialist state."67 Instead, he cites the Charter as merely "a program
for the unification of various classes and groupings amongst the people on
a democratic basis." Mandela maintains that under socialism the workers
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hold state power. They and the peasants own the means of production,
the lands, the factories and the mills. All production is for use and
not profit. The Charter, according to Mandela, does not contemplate such
profound economic and political changes. Its declaration, "The people
shall govern!" visualizes the transfer of power not to any single social
class but to all the people of South Africa, be they workers, peasants,
professional men or petty bourgeoisie.
The Freedom Charter was the first policy document to set up objec
tives for a non-racial democratic South Africa. It was not a socialist
program for it did not envisage the transfer of power to any social class,
but it recognized that without basic changes there could be no over-all
improvement in the conditions of the people and no democratic system of
government.
The South African scene had changed in the meantime. The first
Nationalist Prime Minister, D.F. Malan, retired in 1954. He was succeeded
by J.G. Strydon, nicknamed the "Lion of the North" because he was con
sidered the fearless spokesman for the Nationalists in the Transvaal. It
was Strydon's outspoken objective to maintain "die Baaskap van die Wit man"
(the mastery of the white) and to this end he began to tighten up and
improve the machinery of legislation of apartheid.
Faced with and even sterner opponent than Malan, the ANC and its
allies planned a "Resist-Apartheid Campaign.: The aim of the new cam
paigns were to resist each new apartheid measure as it was promulgated.
The ANC singled out the Western Areas resettlement scheme and the Bantu
Education Act as targets for its attempts at mass mobilization and as its
focal points in the resistance to apartheid. Although the broad objectives
Ibid, pp. 57-58
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of the campaigns were published far and wide, the ANC apparently had no
clear-cut tactical plans for achieving its objectives. People were merely
told to resist, not how to resist. Furthermore, successful resistance
depended on voluntary, sustained mass participation- which was not forth
coming. The failure of the ANC in the Western Areas campaign69 also
followed a misjudgement of the feelings of the people concerned. The
greater majority were eager to leave the overcrowded slum areas. The resis
tance to Bantu Education was of greater importance, since it was to be a
national protest, in the form of a boycott of government-controlled schools
during 1955. The national executive decided, in the face of a government
warning that children who boycotted school would not be admitted, to post
pone the school boycott and boycott the school boards. At this stage the
national executive lost control of the campaign and rebellious branches
induced people again to proceed with the boycott of schools. The task
was entrusted to the Youth League, but again no proper plans were avail
able as to how the boycott should be carried out and sustained. ANC plans
for alternative educational facilities did not materialize and the campaign
collapsed, seriously damaging the prestige of the ANC.
The effects of these failures were disasterous for the ANC. Protests
were mounted in rapid succession as the government speeded up the process
of apartheid. There was no time for adequate preparation. Promises of
alternatives to government services to be boycotted could not be kept.
The ANC did not, even at the best of times, have the resources to replace
government services, and, with one law following another, was even less
in a position to mobilize the means. The failure of these campaigns did
little to add luster to the ANC,and pointed out its powerlessness.
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During 1956-1960 the pass laws were considerably tightened, and the
government took power to serve banishment orders without prior notice to
Africans in rural areas. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Deve
lopment was empowered, subject to certain conditions, to control the pre
sence of Africans at church services, schools, hospitals, clubs and places
of entertainment in urban areas outside African townships. Apartheid was
insisted upon in welfare organizations and some professional bodies.
The government began building separate university colleges for Africans,
Coloured and Asian students. The rates of African taxation were raised;
and for the first time African women whose incomes exceeded 300 Rand per year
were subject to taxation. The cost of living was rising more rapidly
than African wages. New urban housing schemes were on an "economic" basis:
the Africans had, over a period of years, to repay the capital costs and
interest. Many new group area proclamations were gazetted.70
During December of 1956 the police arrested 156 persons on the charge
of high treason, many of them leaders of organizations in the Congress
Alliance. The trial lasted for four years and centered around charges of
the ANC and its allies attempting to overthrow the government by violence,
and the establishment of a Communist state. These charges were based on
the Congress Alliance and the subsequent campaigns. The trial began on
December 19, 1956 and dragged on, as the Prosecution and Defense ploughed
through mountains of evidence that itself constituted the most complete
documentary record of the long history of the ANC. When the trial finally
ground to a halt on March 29, 1961, the accused were found not guilty and
discharged. The government could not prove either that these leaders were
communists nor had any intention of overthrowing the South African government
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by violence. What the trial did accomplish, however, was a strengthening
of the bonds between the ANC and its allies which gave greater insight to
the struggle ahead. However, this unity was born only between the ANC
as a whole and the other members of the Congress Alliance. Within the
ranks of the ANC was disunity that could not be reconciled.
To understand the causes for the split in the ANC which eventually
formed itself into the Pan-Africanist Congress, the concept of "nationalism"
must be understood in its expanded forms. Feit explains African nationalism
as that "amalgam of imported ideas, notions, and conceptions." He con
tends further that there are three streams of thought entering into this
nationalism that are of particular importance: political liberalism, Bible
fundamentalism, and Marxism. Political liberalism was brought by the
Christian missionaries, often the first teachers African knew. Its tone
was that of the nineteenth century, and its emphasis was on "one man, one
vote." It was also from the missionaries that Africans learned their
biblical texts, which they took both seriously and literally. Marxism,
being both "scientific" and "mesannic" bridged the other two streams of
thought and influenced communists and non-communists alike. But Marxism
induced a reaction; younger leaders came to believe that the older leaders
were too much under its spell and were therefore subject to undue influence
of white and Indian communists. The absorption of these members with
multi-racialism and the class struggle blinded them, so thought the younger
members, to the more important matter of African nationalism. The betrayal
of African nationalism was, according to this analysis, sealed with the
adoption of the Freedom Charter. Adoption of the Charter committed the
ANC to a multi-racial "peoples' republic" instead of to a South Africa
71Ibid, p. 28
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resting on Black African majority rule. Africans, the majority, were
going to have to share control with alien minorities.72
The ranks were divided into the Charterists (referring to the Free
dom Charter) and the Africanists. The actual split had its immediate
cause in the failure of the 1958 'stay-at-home' strike. The Congress
Alliance had determined upon a one-day work stoppage on the day of the
all-white parliamentary elections. This proposal was initially rejected
by the ANC, but was forced through by the Europeans and Indians in the
Alliance. When the strike, which had been opposed by the majority of
the provincial divisions of the ANC, had failed, the vexed alliance
leaders demanded disciplinary action against the Africanists who had
actively opposed it. The Africanists held a meeting and sent a final
message to the Charterists,who were now in control of the Congress. They
declared: "We are launching out on our own as the custodian of ANC policy
as formulated in 1912 and pursued up until the time of the Congress
Alliance."73 Thus, due to the ANC's stand on creating a non-racial
classless society, the Pan-Africanists split to struggle for liberation
in their own way towards their own goals. Yet, we shall see the gap
between the ANC and the PAC become narrower in subsequent developments
beginning with the campaign against the pass laws in 1960.
Opposition to passes had a long history. Indeed, one of the ear
liest ANC campaigns was precisely on this issue. When the pass laws were
introduced in 1911, the leaders of the ANC, not yet then welded together
into one organization, led a campaign against the new system. More cam
paigns were mounted subsequently, one in 1919 and another in 1925, a test
case which prevented the extension of passes to women at that time. A
Gibson, op. cit., p. 55
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new anti-pass movement was initiated by the ANC in 1944, and sporadic
protests continued throughout the postwar period. m I960, the govern
ment again tried to extend the pass laws to women, and both the ANC and
the PAC responded to the call.
At its 47th annual conference in December 1959, resolutions were
adopted for a major campaign against passes in I960. A few days later
the PAC held its annual conference and adopted resolutions for a campaign
against passes to be coupled with a campaign for greater courtesy toward
and higher wages for Africans.
Both organizations, it seems, came forward with the same idea at much
the same time. Each organization, however, had different ideas on how
the campaign was to be carried out. The ANC went about things in its
regular cautious and cumbersome way. There were to be three phases to the
campaign: 1) an "anti-Pass" Day on March 31, 1960, followed by 2) and
"African Freedom" Day on April 15 to coincide with, and be directed against,
the white celebrations commemorating the foundation of the Union of South
Africa, and 3) "A National Day of Mourning" on June 26 accompained by a
stay-at-home strike, on which day no African was to go to work. The PAC
Planned something completely different. It decided on a mass campaign in
which Africans would simply leave their reference books at home (while
not destroying them) and would present themselves at police stations asking
to be arrested. The slogan of the campaign was to be: "No bail! No defense!
No fine!" By coming in great numbers demanding arrest, opting for im
prisonment, and accepting sentences, Africans could make the entire opera
tion of the pass system unworkable. All this was reminiscent of the old
Defiance Campaign, but this time it was not picked volunteers of all races
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who were doing the defying, but Africans alone and en masse.
As the time of the campaign approached, PAC leaders began getting
more cautious. Faced with the uncertainties of its first major campaign,
PAC began casting around for allies. "All South Africans, whether ethni
cally African or not, were now called upon to join in what the PAC leader-
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ship called 'this nobel campaign1." Similar caution was shown in the
matter of violence. The PAC stressed its opposition to violence, just as
the ANC had done. The only thing different about this campaign from the
ANC campaign was that the ANC refused to join ranks. To have entered into
a campaign at the behest of its rivals would have been tantamount to
an abdication of the political leadership of Africans which the ANC planned.
Nonetheless, the first stage of the campaign was to be enacted out at
Sharpeville.
On March 21, 1960 a crowd of Black South Africans estimated at between
five and seven thousand people formed a procession of about three-quarters
of a mile long, and headed towards the municipal office at Sharpeville in
defiance of the pass laws. The police charged at the crowd, threw tear-
gas bombs, and started making arrests. This increased the tension and when
the crowds started throwing stones, the police responded with bullets. On
March 22, it was announced that 69 Africans were killed and 186 wounded.
Luthuli called for "a Day of Mourning" and a stay-at-home strike, both
well-supported and almost complete. Those who did not participate found
trouble awaiting them in the townships. Riots broke out in the country
from Cape Town to Durban, and the country was soon thrown into a "State
of Emergency." On March 30 the "State of Emergency" was made official
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and in a nationwide sweep, 98 whites, 36 Coloureds, 90 Asians and 11,279
Africans were taken into detention. The arrested included most of the
better-known ANC leaders, the leaders of the various congresses allied
with the ANC, as well as militant opponents outside these groups. These
arrests served to deprive the ANC and its allies of effective leadership
and assured that order was maintained on April 10, when the pass laws
were again to be enforced. The ANC and the PAC were declared illegal, and
it became a serious offense to carry on its activities or advocate its
aims.75
Sharpeville precipitated the end of the era of non-violence. Violent
struggle was to become the only means of achieving freedom for the African
people. The ANC was banned and entered a period of illegal existence. For
all practical purposes, the ANC was merely the last threads of the previous
movement. In its place arose a new and more revolutionary organization which
relied on violence as a tactic of struggle- the only tactic which the white
South African can hear. This organization was to be known as Umkonto we
Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), and it is here, rather than with the vaguely
defined ranks of the ANC-proper, that this analysis shall follow during the
years 1960-1963.
The year 1960 represented the coming of age of the African National
Congress. Umkonto was born through the dying moans of the 69 Africans
murdered at Sharpeville. Nelson Mandela, father of the illegitimate
movement, had been through a long courtship with the ANC since his early
leadership in the Youth League. Mandela, son of a Tembu chief, was born
in the Transkei, attended Fort Hare University, and began practicing law
in Johanesburg with his longtime friend and fellow freedom fighter
75-
Walshe, op. cit., pp. 13-14
57
Oliver Tambo. Mandela is described as "passionate, emotional, sensitive,
quickly stung to bitterness and retaliation by patronage and insult."
Mandela was an instrumental figure in the founding of the Youth League,
an organization of "a new generation turned to political action, infected
by discontent with an outspoken and vigorous nationalism."'' The Youth
League openly attacked past policies of the conservative ANC and the leader
ship of vacillation and compromise. The militant ideas of the Youth League
were forerunners of the ultimate formation of Umkonto.
After the government placed a ban on the ANC, a caretaker committee
had been formed to re-organize the ANC into an underground movement. An
ad hoc committee of African leaders, among them Paul Mosaka, Duma Nokwe,
Govan Mbeki, J. Ngubane, and Nelson Mandela summoned an All-in African
Conference in Pietersmartizburg for March, 1961.
White South Africa was preparing to referendum to declare itself a
Nationalist Republic. The freedom struggle urged that there was one last
opportunity to prevent race disaster. There should be convened a full
representative gathering- representative of all races- a new national con
vention to draft a new democratic constitution.
The demand for the holding of a national convention to draft a non-
color bar constitution was the claim of the disfranchised, the overwhelming
majority of South Africans, that the vote be extended to them. The stay-
at-home strike following the conference was a dramatic action to drive the
demand home. The government answered the strike call with the country's
biggest mobilization since the war. Civil liberties were suspended. South
Africa was again in a state of emergency. On June 26, 1961 Nelson Mandela
went into hiding.
Quoted from Oliver Tambo in Mandela, op. cit., p. xi
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Mandela's decision to remain underground to prepare new fighting
forces was indicative of a new mood sweeping the African people. The
government mobilization to smash the strike had been a turning point in
the country. Africans decided that the violence of the state made peace
ful protest futile. In December, 1961, the first acts of sabotage announced
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the formation of Umkonto.
Umkonto did not achieve its final form all at once, but passed through
a series of developmental phases. Those who came together at the beginning,
in mid-June 1961, joined a nameless organization. Groups of African, whites,
and Indians, most of whom were members either of one of the Congress Alliance
organizations or of the South African Communist Party, were assembled in
different centers. Their only qualification at that stage was the willing-
79
ness to undertake acts of sabotage.
Although Umkonto began in seemingly unplanned fashion, attempts to
mold it in the format of a modified M-Plan were soon made. The aims of
the re-organization were to: 1) consolidate the movement's machinery; 2)
enable the transmission of the important decisions taken on a national
level to every member of the organization without calling public meetings,
issuing press statements, and printing circulars; 3) to build up in the
local branches themselves local factions which would eventually represent
the strength and will of the people; and 4) extend and strengthen the
ties between the organization and the people. Referring to this last
aim, Mandela writes:
"From now on the activities of Congressites
must not be confined to speeches and reso
lutions. Their activities must find their
expression in wide-scale work among the
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masses, work which will enable them to make
the greatest possible contacts with the
working people."80
He attests this new relationship of the leaders to the masses to the
generally raised political level of the people and their consciousness
of their strength. Mandela realized that in a country such as South Africa
a political organization that did not receive the support of the workers
is in fact paralyzed on the very ground on which it has chosed to wage
battle. Thus, we see in Umkonto; 1) an organization which grew out of
an association of the two oldest organizations which had consistently
opposed white supremacy- the ANC and the South African Communist Party;
2) a better financed organization, better organized and more ambitious than
any of its rivals; and, 3) a mass based organization which turned to vio
lence only when, for forty-seven years, all else failed.
Early in 1962 Mandela made a surprise appearance as the leader of
the ANC delegation to the Addis Abbaba Conference of the Pan-African Free
dom Movement of East and Central Africa. He had left South Africa tem
porarily to convey personally news to Africa of the crisis developing at
home and the decision to embark upon violent means of struggle. In his
speech to the conference, Mandela attempts to justify Umkonto's turn to
violence:
"During the last ten years the African people
of South Africa have fought many freedom
battles involving civil disobedience, strikes,
protests marches, boycotts and demonstrations
of all kinds. In all these campaigns we
repeatedly stressed the importance of disci
plined, peaceful and non-violent struggle.
We did so firstly because we felt that there
were still opportunities for peaceful struggle
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and we sincerely worked for peaceful changes.
Secondly, we did not want to expose our people
to situations where they might become targets
for the trigger-happy South African police.
But the situation has now radically altered.
South Africa is now a land ruled by the gun."81
Special emphasis was given to the stay-at-home strike of June 26 as a
case in point. Mandela states that the strike, in accordance with ANC
policy, was to be a peaceful demonstration. Careful instructions were
given to organizers and members to avoid any recourse to violence. The
government's answer was to introduce new and harsher laws to mobilize its
armed forces, and to send armed vehicles and soldiers into the townships
in a massive show of force intended to intimidate the people. This was
an indication that the government had decided to rule by force alone, and
this decision was a milestone on the road to Umkonto.
On October 22, 1962 Mandela was tried in Pretoria for inciting workers
to strike (May stay-at-home) and for leaving South Africa without a valid
travel document (Addis Conference). He was sentenced to three years im
prisonment on the first charge and two years on the second.
Meanwhile, Umkonto was waging a front-line battle using the act of
sabotage as a means of struggle. Mandela had considered the four possible
means of violence: sabotage, guerilla warfare, terrorism and open re
volution. Sabotage was chosen because of two reason: Firstly, sabotage
did not involve loss of life and, according to Mandela, offered the best
hope for future race relations. Secondly, Umkonto recognized that South
Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and on foreign trade.
They felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with
railway and telephone communications would tend to scare capital away from
Ibid, p.19
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the country, would make it more difficult for goods from the industrial
areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be an
economic burden on the country, thus compelling the voters to reconsider
their position. Attacks on the economic structure of the country were
to be linked with government buildings and other symbols of the apartheid
state. Feit has recorded 193 acts of sabotage committed by Umkonto
members.^
On June 11, 1963 the police raided the underground headquarters in
Rivonia, a Johannesburg surburb, and arrested Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki,
Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathreda, Dennis Goldberg, Lionel Bernstein and
others. The Rivoni Trial began October, 1963, and Mandela was taken
from his cell to join those facing trial for sabotage and a conspiracy to
overthrow the government by revolution and by assisting an armed invasion
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by foreign troops.
Mandela opened the defense, and in his statement to court on April
20, 1964, he admitted that he had been one of the founders of Umkonto:
"I have already mentioned that I was one of the
persons who helped to form Umkonto. I, and the
others who started the organization, did so for
two reasons. Firstly, we believe that as a re
sult of government policy, violence by the Afri
can people had become inevitable. All lawful
models of expressing opposition to this princi
ple of white supremacy had been closed by legis
lation, and we were placed in a position in
which we either had to accept a permanent state
of inferiority, or to defy the government. We
chose to defy the law. We first broke the law
in a way which avoided any recourse of violence;
when this form was legislated against and then
the government resorted to a show of force to
crush opposition to its policies, only then did
we decide to answer violence with violence."85
g^ pp. 164-174
84Feit, op. cit., pp. 325-345
Mandela, op. cit., p. 160
B:>Ibid, p. 164
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Violence became and is the South African's only means of achieving
liberation.
Ruth First writes:
"The Rivonia Trial marked the abandonment of the
African struggle of any illusions, constitutional
or otherwise, about the nature of the combat. The
non-violent phase of the liberation struggle was
over; the period of underground resistance had
begun. The trial and the wave of oppression that
accompanied and followed it were intended to in
capacitate the leadership that had grown from the
years of mass action and that was capable of taking
the struggle in new, dangerous, and exacting direc
tions. "86
Thus, we have seen the evolution of ideology and tactics through
out the history of the African National Congress of South Africa- an
evolution that was marked by the fact that greater militancy was adopted
during each stage only as a result of the government's response to non-vio
lence with violence. Discussion and negotiation about the South African
situation will continue indefinitely as to the ways and means by which
South Africa will transform the government into one of majority rule.
The discussion is futile, however, because history has taught the South
African that the only words that the Afrikaaner will listen to are those
spoken at the end of a gun. The struggle will not be easy; the resistance
in South Africa which will be taken today must not only fight against the
predatory settler colonialism that has alienated the peasant from his land
and coerced him into contract labor in mines and on plantations, but also
against the massive state apparatus of a modern industrial economy and all
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the weapons within which a state such as this has to defend itself.
Nonetheless, the sooner a protracted struggle is to erupt, the sooner the
South African can begin to devise a society based on justice, equality and
what he perceives to be the African way of life.
86-




The African National Congress of South Africa began in 1913 as a
movement to unite the various tribal groupings in South Africa and to
provide the African people with a representative body to deal with the
increasingly oppressive legislation being passed through the white South
African Parliament. It is essentially an elite-led, reformist organi
zation which sought African participation in the political, social, and
economic spheres of South African society. The struggle was seen as a
constitutional one which would be fought with the aid of white liberals.
Protest was first aimed at the British government in hopes that Great
Britain would enforce the law demanding equal rights for all subjects of
the Crown regardless of national origin. The British refused to address
the question regarding African rights and continued to support the white
South African regime. Protest then switched to the South African govern
ment itself, yet with even more disasterous results than the ANC's dealing
with England. More and more restrictions were placed on the African people,
and more and more land and resources were being surrendered to South Africa's
expanding economy. African labor was valued as the most important commo
dity in the economy, and the government employed any and all means by which
to buy this labor at the cheapest price and control its movements into the
most advantageous positions for capitalistic interests. The African National
Congress fought a constitutional battle for thirty-six years, and with the
passage of the Hertzog Bills, the futility of the struggle was made irre
vocably clear. Other means of resistance were to be devised.
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By 1940 it became clear to the ANC that a mass base would be needed
to carry on further resistance and efforts were channeled into mobilizing
the vast number of Africans into a viable source of power to fight against
the white South African's massive state apparatus. Resistance was to take
the form of boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience within a non-violent
framework. From 1949 to 1952, a hugh Defiance Campaign was carried out to
protest the infamous apartheid laws. This resulted in increasing restric
tions placed on the African people and outrageous punishments inflicted upon
any person opposing the policies of the apartheid state. The stay-at-home
strike sought to cause economic suffering in the white community while pro
tecting the African protestor from the bodily harm used to curtail resis
tance by the South African police. The government responded to each peace
ful, non-violent form of resistance with violence. Mass mobilization of
the state's massive military apparatus was used without restraint to inti
midate and, at times, to massacre the African protester. Again and again
the government responded to non-violent action with violent counteraction.
As the passing of the Hertzog Bills represented the end of the constitutional
struggle, the incident at Sharpeville represented the end of the non-vio
lent struggle. It became clear that the white South Africans would not
hand over their power and privileges as a result of appealing to their
sense of justice. Justice was to be found only at the end of a gun. A
new phase in the South African struggle had begun- a struggle that had
learned the lessons that history had taught.
The study of the African National Congress is a study of change.
From a non-violent struggle to a violent one and from a movement advocating
mere participation within the existing system to one recognizing the need
for a radical redistribution of power and wealth, the African National
Congress liberated itself from the constraints imposed upon a bourgeois
organization by its very nature. Leadership passed from the hands of the
65
"Europeanized" African elite who professed the desire for participation
of the so-called "civilized" African within the white power structure to
a new more militant urban generation which realized that liberation would
be complete only when the masses of Africans received a fair share of the
country's wealth. Marxism replaced Christianity as the blueprint for
proposed change, as can be seen by the ANC's stronger alliance with the
South African Communist Party and the new leadership's familiarity with
Marxist ideology. South Africa has been described as a powder-keg that
will explode at any moment. It is in the hands of the new African leader
ship to pick up the debris and mold it into an African society where the
power contained within the country's immense wealth rests in the hands of
those who use their labor to create this wealth.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Africa Research Group. Race to Power. (New York: Anchor Press, 1974)
Benson, Mary. The African Patroits. (ChicagoEncyclopedia Britannica,
1964)
Boxer, C.R. The Portugese Seaborn Empire. (London:Hutchinson, 1968)
Bunting, Brian. The Rise of the South African Reich. (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Press, 1969)
Cabral, Amilcar. Return to the Source (New York:Africa Information
Service, 1973)
Carter, Gwendolyn. Five African States. (Cornell University Press, 1963)
, The Politics of_ Inequality:South Africa Since 1948.
(New York:Praeger Press, 1958)
Edward Feit, African Opposition in South Africa:The Failure of Passive
Resistance. (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1967)
, Urban Revolt in South Africa 1960 to 1964. (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1971)
Gibson, Richard, Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule.
(New York;Oxford University Press, 1972)
,African Liberation Movements. (New York:Oxford
University Press, 1972)
Hodgekin, Thomas. African Political Parties. (Baltimore:Penguin Press,
1961)
Hogan, Jim. South Africa civilizations in Conflict. (Boston:Houghton
Miflin Co., 1972)
Kotze, D.A. African Politics in_ South Africa, 1964-1974. (London:
C.~Hurst, 1975)
Kuper, Les. An African Bourgeoisie:Race, Class and Politics in South
Africa. (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1965)
, Passive Resistance in South Africa. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1957)
Luthuli, Albert. Let My People Go. (New York:McGraw Hill, 1962)
66
67
Mandela, Nelson. No Easy Walk to Freedom. (LondonrHeinemen, 1965)
Modisane, Bloke. Blame Me On History. (London:Thames and Hudson,
1963)
Roux, Edward. Time Longer Than Rope. (University of Wisconsin Press,
1972)
Waishe, Peter. The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa.
(Berkeley:University of Cal. Press, 1972)
Wilson, Monica and Thompson, Leonard. The Oxford History of South
Africa. Vol. I (OxfordrThe Clarendon Press, 1969)
